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Abstract. We estimate the impact of the world’s largest public works program, India’s 
National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG), on agricultural wages. NREG was rolled out 
across India in three distinct phases, and this phased introduction is used to identify 
difference-in-difference estimates of the program effect. Using monthly data on wage rates 
from the period 2000–2011 in 209 districts across 18 Indian states, we include district-
specific fixed effects and trends to control for differences in wage rates in the absence of the 
program. We find that, on average, the program boosted the growth rate of real daily 
agricultural wages by 4.3% per year. The effect of the scheme is more consistent with an 
increase in the growth rate of wages than with a discontinuous jump in wages. The effect was 
concentrated in some states and in the agricultural peak season, appears to have been gender-
neutral and was biased towards unskilled labor. Since many of the world’s poorest depend on 
casual agricultural labor for their livelihood, while at the same time minimum-wage 
legislation is unlikely to be effective in many developing countries, we argue that rural public 
employment programs constitute a potentially important anti-poverty policy tool. 
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Seventy per cent of the world’s 1.4 billion extremely poor live in rural areas (International 
Fund for Agricultural Development 2011). Some of them till their own land, but at the 
bottom of the pyramid are landless laborers who subsist on casual agricultural wage labor 
(International Labor Organization 1996). Direct transfers aside, policies that can put upward 
pressure on agricultural day wages are therefore likely to be one of the most effective ways of 
improving the welfare of the poorest people on the planet.3 
Implementing minimum wage legislation is unrealistic in most developing countries, 
but public employment programs can be a useful tool for increasing labor demand. It has long 
been hypothesized that this increase in demand for labor may, if large enough, push wages up 
through a general equilibrium effect. If so, the welfare effects of public employment schemes 
could reach well beyond the people who are directly employed by them.4 
This paper looks at a large-scale public employment program—the Indian 
government’s National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG)—and analyses its impact on 
agricultural wages. Using a decade’s worth (2000–2011) of monthly data on agricultural 
wages for a panel of over 200 Indian districts, we find that, on average, NREG boosted the 
real daily agricultural wage rate in India by 4.3% per year. A key contribution of the paper is 
the use of monthly observations of wages, allowing us to undertake analysis that would not 
be possible with less frequent observations. The key findings suggest that the introduction of 
NREG in an average district caused an increase in the growth rate of wages in the district, as 
opposed to a one-off step increase — a gradual increase rather than a jump. This is consistent 
with the notion that the program gradually increased in intensity once launched. While the 
impact on the growth rate of agricultural wages is unlikely to continue indefinitely, we do not 
find evidence that it had diminished by the end of our time series, three years after its 
introduction in all of India’s rural districts. 
The idea of tying welfare benefits to work requirements goes back at least as far as 
                                               
3 A large literature confirms the negative association between agricultural wages and poverty rates 
(Deaton and Drèze 2002, Eswaran et al. 2009, Kijima and Lanjouw 2005, Lanjouw and Murgai 2009). 
4 However, this would not be a Pareto improvement: increases in wage rates correspond to higher input 
prices for employers. But given that agricultural employers are almost invariably better off than the landless, and 





pre-revolutionary France, where the poor could receive alms in return for work at ‘charity 
workshops’. The English Poor Law of 1834 required the poor to live in ‘workhouses’ in order 
to receive welfare (Himmelfarb 1984). British colonial administrators in India frequently 
used public works to deliver famine relief (Drèze 1990). Katz (1996) discusses work 
requirements to access welfare in the United States in the 19th and early 20th century. In 
Germany, public works were used in the 1930s to alleviate unemployment and build inter-
city highways—many of which are still in use today. The term ‘workfare’ was coined in the 
United States in the late 1960s to describe the idea of social benefits tied to work 
requirements. Public works have diminished in importance in rich countries, but they are still 
widespread in the developing world. Subbarao (2003) provides an overview of contemporary 
public employment programs in Asia and Africa. 
Despite the long history of public employment programs, academics and 
policymakers continue to debate their effect on the poor and on wider society. Theory 
suggests5 that public works have three potential effects on welfare: a direct effect on those 
employed in the works; a labor market effect related to the shift in labor demand; and a 
productivity effect related to the investment in public goods produced under the scheme. The 
labor market effect would include, but need not be limited to, an increase in wages.6 It is also 
conceivable that the public goods created under the scheme could have a direct effect on 
welfare in addition to the possible increase in labor productivity. 
Note that with our data, we are unable to distinguish empirically between the labor 
market and productivity mechanisms, but our general impression of the reality of NREG 
aligns with that of the World Bank (2011), who write that ‘the objective of asset creation runs 
a very distant second to the primary objective of employment generation.’7 
India and NREG provide a good context in which to study the impact of public 
employment programs on wages. First, NREG is an enormous program by any standard and 
is therefore of considerable interest in itself. In the financial year 2010–11, it generated 2.6 
                                               
5 See Ravallion (1990) for a theoretical discussion on the effects of public works on welfare. 
6 NREG can benefit the poor through efficiency gains in an agricultural labour market characterised by 
distortions such as monopsony power of the employers (Basu et al. 2009) or labour-tying (Basu 2013). 
7 However, Ranaware et al (2015) find in a survey that 90% of users of works produced under NREG 





billion person-days of employment. Evaluations of pilot schemes are often criticized on the 
basis that the observed effects may not be scalable. That critique certainly does not apply 
here, and any lessons learnt should be of broad interest. Second, empirical studies of the wage 
effects of public works programs are rare in part because of a scarcity of reliable wage data. 
The availability of good wage data at a disaggregated regional and temporal level is a great 
advantage of studying the Indian context. Third, the scheme was introduced in 2006 and 
extended to all of India (except disputed and wholly urban areas) in 2008 in three distinct 
phases. The phased rollout allows us to use difference-in-difference estimation as our 
identification strategy. In other words, the districts in which NREG was already present, or 
not yet present, provide information on contemporaneous non-NREG wage increases, so that 
the estimated effect attributed to NREG is net of other trends. Fourth, India is a large and 
diverse country. The federal structure provides ample empirical variation, while also making 
internal validity easier to defend than for cross-country studies. 
The paper makes two key contributions. First, it estimates the effect of a large 
employment program on wages in a developing country. There are several theoretical studies 
analyzing these issues, but empirical tests of these theories in a developing country context 
are still rare. Second, our dataset allows us to test for heterogeneous effects across regions, 
seasons, skill category and gender, while allowing for district-specific trends in wage rates to 
address endogeneity concerns. 
Our main findings are as follows: NREG increased the growth rate of agricultural 
wages by 4.3% per year in the average district in the first few years after its introduction. The 
effect does not appear to have diminished by mid-2011. The effect is strongest in states that 
are traditionally strong in the implementation of social programs and in states that have 
previously been identified as ‘star performers’ in NREG implementation. The effect appears 
to be concentrated in the main agricultural season in India, that is, in the second half of the 
calendar year, when agricultural labor is relatively scarce. The scheme mainly affects wages 
for unskilled as opposed to skilled labor. There is no discernible difference in the effect on 
men’s and women’s wages. The effect is positive and significant across districts in all three 
phases of implementation. 
Our paper relates to the theoretical literature on rural public works, targeting and 





highlight the targeting benefits of attaching work requirements to welfare.8 Besley and Coate 
(1992) emphasize the screening benefits of workfare in both developed and developing 
countries.9 They argue that work requirements make it easier for the government to screen 
individuals and assess their circumstances on a case-by-case basis. The situation is, however, 
more complex in developing countries, as it is often difficult to judge the earning potential of 
welfare applicants. Besley and Coate present the optimal workfare program for screening 
purposes and derive a sufficient condition for this to be cheaper than cash benefits. More 
recently, Basu, Chau and Kanbur (2009) and Basu (2013) show theoretically that workfare 
programs can benefit the poor through efficiency gains in an agricultural labor market 
characterized by distortions such as labor tying and employer monopsony. 
The empirical literature on public works and agricultural wages is growing. Ravallion, 
Datt and Chaudhuri (1993) and Gaiha (1997) study the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
(MEG) which was operational in the Indian state of Maharashtra from 1970 until it was 
superseded by NREG. They authors study the impact of an official wage increase in 1988 on 
MEG employment and conclude that there is ‘little sign in these data of anything more than a 
slight impact of changes in the [MEG] wage on agricultural wages in either the short run or 
the long run.’ Gaiha (1997) examines the impact of MEG on agricultural wages using 
monthly data. He finds a positive effect of MEG on agricultural wages in Maharashtra. Our 
study differs from these in that we look at a nationwide program and use monthly and district 
level data from 18 states. Our identification strategy also differs in that we exploit the phased 
rollout of NREG to compute a difference-in-difference type estimator. 
There are now a number of studies that relate specifically to NREG. Mann and Pande 
(2012) provide an overview of published and unpublished work up to 2012. Drèze and 
Oldiges (2011) examine the implementation of NREG using administrative data. Using 
household data from three Indian states, Jha, Bhattacharyya and Gaiha (2011) analyze the 
nutritional impact of NREG wage, non-NREG income, and Public Distribution System (PDS) 
participation. Dutta et al. (2012) use 2009–10 NSS data to show that there is much unmet 
                                               
8 van de Walle (1998) presents a review of the literature on targeting. Besley and Kanbur (1993) also 
discuss the merits of targeting in welfare projects. 
9 They also emphasise the deterrent argument, whereby workfare might encourage poverty-reducing 





demand for NREG work in all states. Niehaus and Sukhtankar (2013a, 2013b) study the 
effect on corruption of a statutory increase in NREG wages. Klonner and Oldiges (2014) 
assess the impact of NREG on poverty and welfare. Muralidharan et al (2016) find that 
NREG was delivered more efficiently after the introduction of a smartcard system in Andhra 
Pradesh. Afridi et al (2016) study the effect of parental participation in NREG on children’s 
educational attainment. While some of these studies empirically analyze poverty and 
nutritional impact of NREG at the household level, none of them deal with the impact of 
NREG on agricultural wages. 
We are aware of three papers, concurrent with ours, that estimate the impact of NREG 
on earnings. Azam (2012), Imbert and Papp (2015) and Zimmermann (2012) all use 
household-level cross-sectional survey data from the National Sample Survey (NSS), while 
we employ a long-running series of district-wise monthly wage rates called Agricultural 
Wages in India (AWI). Like us, Azam as well as Imbert and Papp use the phased roll-out of 
the scheme to identify difference-in-differences estimates. They construct their data using 
several NSS ‘thick rounds’, ‘thin rounds’, and ‘sub-rounds’.10 While Imbert and Papp find 
that NREG increases casual earnings, and more so for men than for women, Azam also 
reports an overall positive earnings effect but a larger effect for women. Their findings of 
earnings increases align well with ours. However, we do not find a statistically significant 
gender difference in the effect of NREG, and we argue that the difference may arise because 
we study wage rates rather than earnings. Zimmermann (2012) also draws on NSS data, but 
uses a regression discontinuity design rather than computing differences in differences, and 
finds zero or marginal earnings effects for both men and women. Thus, while drawing on the 
same data, these three papers report qualitatively different findings. 
Relative to these three studies, our paper’s contribution is in part to use a completely 
unrelated source of data to investigate whether NREG has had a general-equilibrium effect on 
wages. While NSS data are collected relatively infrequently, our data source provides 
monthly observations by district. As well as providing an independent estimate of the effect 
                                               
10 The sample size in NSS varies significantly across rounds. The quinquennial surveys (also known as 
‘thick’ rounds) typically have large sample sizes and are more reliable. In between the thick rounds, NSS conducts 
‘thin rounds’ with much smaller sample sizes. In between ‘thin rounds’ NSS conducts very small ‘sub-rounds’ 
where the sample is not stratified and potentially unreliable (National Sample Survey Organisation 2007). In the 





of NREG on wages, this allows us to undertake analysis which can only with difficulty be 
done with NSS. Rather than just comparing wages averaged over some period before and 
some period after the introduction of NREG, we are able to conclude that the effect was 
gradual. While the AWI offers superior data frequency, its district coverage is limited in 
practice and covers only 42% of the Indian population in our main specification. This could 
potentially explain why some of our findings differ from those in related work. 
Unlike the NSS-based studies, we control for pre-existing district-level trends in 
wages, in addition to district fixed effects, to address concerns of bias arising from the fact 
that the allocation of districts to the three phases was based on an indicator of ‘backwardness’ 
rather than random. We study heterogeneity of the wage effect by month of the year 
(seasonality). Unlike the analyses based on NSS data, which club together Phases I and II and 
study them as a single intervention, we can and do study the effect of NREG across the three 
phases separately. We have enough pre-program data to construct placebo tests as further 
robustness checks. Finally, because our data provide wages by type of agricultural labor, we 
can contrast the wage effect for unskilled labor with those for several categories of skilled 
labor. 
2. The	National	Rural	Employment	Guarantee	
NREG is the latest in a succession of rural employment programs in India. The primary 
objective is to provide wage employment to un- and under-employed agricultural laborers, 
but it also aims produce and restore public goods, typically in the form of local infrastructure, 
and to promote decentralized governance. Much of the responsibility for implementing the 
program is assigned to the Gram Panchayats (GPs), the lowest tier of elected government. 
Despite the precursors, the passing of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA) in 2005 was widely seen as a significant event.11 For the first time, the Indian 
government enacted a commitment to provide employment. In addition to providing 
‘enhancement of livelihood security of the households in rural areas of the country by 
providing at least 100 days of guaranteed wage employment to every household in unskilled 
                                               





manual work’ (Ministry of Law and Justice 2005), the act also created other entitlements: 
Work is to be provided within 15 days of receipt of a written or oral job application. 
Applicants are entitled to an unemployment allowance if the local government fails to 
provide work, and to a transport allowance if the site is more than 5km from their home. The 
act stipulates equal wages for men and women, and it sets down some minimum standards for 
the worksites, including access to drinking water, shade and childcare. The operational 
guidelines supplementing the act (Ministry of Rural Development 2008) provide more detail. 
The program was rolled out across all of India’s districts (except disputed areas and 
wholly urban districts) in three distinct phases. Two hundred districts, considered by the 
government’s Planning Commission to be the most ‘backward’, received the program in 
February 2006. A further 130 districts received the program in April 2007, and the remaining 
districts followed in April 2008. This phased roll-out serves as the basis for our identification 
strategy. However, as the allocation of districts to the three phases was based on 
‘backwardness’,12 it will be important to take account of possible pre-existing differences 
between districts when estimating the program’s effect on wages. 
Table 1 presents a summary of NREG operations in the period 2006–2016, based on 
official records. Annual expenditure on NREG increased rapidly in the roll-out period (2006–
2008), and has averaged $7 billion or 0.4% of India’s GDP since 2008. Given that 
government spending as a share of GDP in India is approximately 10%, NREG represents 
about 4% of India’s government spending. The number of households who obtain work under 
NREG fluctuates around 50 million per year. This corresponds to about a fifth of all Indian 
households, and more than a quarter of rural households. NREG is, by an order of magnitude, 
the world’s largest public works program in terms of the number of beneficiaries (World 
Bank 2015). For an account of the program in the period we analyze, based on official data, 
see Drèze and Oldiges (2011). 
Discrepancies between lawmakers’ intentions and ground realities have been noted by 
several analysts. A government audit in 2008 found many irregularities in the way the 
scheme was implemented at the state, district and local levels (Comptroller and Auditor 
General of India 2008). Imbert and Papp (2011) compare reported labor participation in the 
                                               
12 Zimmermann (2012) and Klonner and Oldiges (2014) provide more detail on the ‘backwardness index’ 





scheme with household data from the National Sample Survey, and find that only 46–52% of 
reported person-days of employment can be confirmed. However, such measurement error is 
unlikely to affect our estimates, as we use a binary treatment variable and exposure to NREG 
in months as our key explanatory variables. A clear advantage of these is that they do not rely 
on official reports of labor participation or scheme activity. 
NREG activity is highly seasonal (Planning Commission 2013), and activity tends to 
peak in the dry season, March–June, when demand for agricultural labor is low. However, it 
has been observed that NREG activity can drop sharply between March (the last month of the 
financial year) and April, suggesting that activity was at least partly supply-led in the early 
years (e.g., Dey and Bedi, 2010). 
3. Data	
The main data used here are from the Agricultural Wages in India (AWI) series. The series 
was initiated in 1951, but only data for the period 2000–2011 are used here. The AWI series 
is published by the Indian Ministry of Agriculture and provides daily wage rates for a number 
of categories of rural labor. For most categories, there are separate series for men and women. 
AWI covers three main categories of unskilled labor: ‘field labor’, ‘other agricultural labor’ 
and ‘herding’. The most important category, field labor, is for several states further 
disaggregated into four tasks: ploughing, sowing, weeding and reaping. In contrast, ‘other 
agricultural labor’ is not further disaggregated, but includes tasks like digging and carrying. 
The third category of unskilled labor is ‘herding’, the data quality for which is patchy and 
where the unit of measurement is sometimes unclear. The focus of the analysis will be on 
wages for field labor, as this is by far the most important category, but we also look at wages 
for ‘other agricultural labor’.13 
Wage rates are also provided for three categories of skilled labor: carpenters, 
blacksmiths, and cobblers. Female wage data are not provided for these categories, probably 
                                               
13 Based on National Sample Survey (2006), Table 42, the proportion of person-days of manual casual 
labour in agriculture that was devoted to ‘cultivation’ was 89%. While it is not clear that ‘cultivation’ in the 
National Sample Survey corresponds exactly to ‘field labour’ in AWI, they are at least closely related: both include 
the subtasks of ploughing, sowing, weeding and harvesting. It seems reasonable, therefore, to conclude that field 





because workers in these categories in India are nearly always men. 
The AWI series is the most widely used source for time series analysis of agricultural 
wages in India (Himanshu 2005). The World Bank’s state-level data set, developed by Özler, 
Datt and Ravallion (1996), draws on the AWI district-level data and aggregates them using 
National Sample Survey (NSS) weights to arrive at state level numbers. Ravallion et al. 
(1993) also use AWI data. 
The AWI data are collected by local officials in each district. They collect information 
from a sample of agricultural workers from a nominated center or village in each district, and 
report the average. For our purposes, the series has several advantages. First, it provides wage 
rates disaggregated down to the month and district levels. Second, unskilled wages are 
reported by gender, which allows us to test whether NREG has affected the gender wage gap. 
Third, it reports agricultural wages in several categories, which allows us to distinguish 
between the effects of NREG on skilled and unskilled wages. 
Not every district is covered in the AWI data, and the reasons for this are not well 
understood. Our regressions are based on all AWI data available for the period 2000–2011. 
Based on these, we construct longitudinal data on wages in 18 states that collectively cover 
94% of the Indian population (based on the 2011 census). Across the 18 states we use, in our 
main specification, wage data from 40% of districts, covering 42% of the population. 
However, there is considerable variation in how many districts are represented from each 
state (Appendix 3). While it is not known why some districts are missing from AWI, the 
pattern is stable over time and unlikely to be correlated with the roll-out of NREG. We 
believe that our results are largely representative for most of India, with the exception of a 
few major states that are not represented or under-represented in the data—notably Punjab 
(no districts in the data) and Jharkhand.14 The heterogeneity in data availability is also an 
additional reason for undertaking state-by-state analysis (section 5.2). 
The AWI series has been criticized for its ‘black-box’ data collection methodology. 
Himanshu (2005) argues that the officials in charge of collecting data from each district are 
                                               
14 Maharashtra is represented by only two districts, but this is a special case as there was a large-scale, 
state-level employment guarantee scheme (the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee) in place in this state for 






not given detailed instructions on how to do so, and in most cases the reported wages are not 
based on representative survey data. The data are also collected from one specific ‘center’ in 
each district, which may or may not be representative of the district as a whole. Still, we 
believe that for our purposes the AWI is a good source of data, because any weaknesses 
associated with the collection methodology are unlikely to be correlated with the phased 
rollout of NREG. That is, as long as any over- or under-reporting did not get systematically 
weaker or stronger as NREG was introduced in a district, our estimated effects are still 
identified. ‘White noise’ measurement error due to weaknesses in the collection methodology 
should attenuate the estimated effect and make it harder to detect, so that our estimates would 
be conservative rather than exaggerated. 
In an early paper, Rao (1972) compares data from the AWI series to NSS data. While 
AWI tend to report higher wages than those in NSS, the two series are highly correlated. He 
finds that AWI data lack in precision but condones their use for testing ‘directional’ 
hypothesis and for comparison of wages across regions. Deaton and Drèze (2002) find that 
the AWI series are highly negatively correlated with expenditure-based poverty indices. 
Besides explicitly focusing on wages rather than earnings, using AWI data also has several 
advantages over NSS data for our purposes, as described in the Introduction. 
All wage data are deflated to constant January 2000 prices using the Consumer Price 
Index for Rural Labourers, which is available by month and state and published by the Indian 
Bureau of Labour. The estimated coefficients are therefore to be interpreted as effects on real 
wages. 
Our main interest is in wages for field labor. In AWI, these are reported by gender 
and, for most states, by task (ploughing, sowing, weeding and reaping). We construct an 
overall field labor wage series as follows. First, for each district and month, and separately 
for men and women, we compute a simple average across the tasks. Missing values are 
ignored;15 that is, for each district and month, we take the average of wages for those tasks 
that are reported. Three states (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra) only report 
                                               
15 If missing data are correlated with program roll-out, our estimates could be biased. We check for this 
by constructing a binary variable equal to 1 if the constructed main field labour variable is missing for a district 
and month. This variable is regressed on the treatment binary variable as well as on NREG exposure, along with 






wages for field labor in general as opposed to by task. 
Second, we take the simple average of the resulting series for men and women. Where 
only men’s or only women’s wages are reported, we set the average to be missing. We look 
for differential effects by gender in section 5.5. 
Figure 1 illustrates the phase-wise rollout of NREG in India. Phase I districts are 
shown in yellow, Phase II districts in orange and Phase III districts in brown. Phase III 
districts appear to dominate in the northern, western and southern parts of the country, while 
Phase I districts are more commonly found in central and eastern parts. Nevertheless, each 
region of India and all the major states have some districts in each phase. 
Figure 2 plots agricultural real wages against time, averaged across all districts in 
each phase. Note that the wages in Phase I districts are the lowest and average wages in Phase 
III districts are higher than Phases I and II, reflecting the non-random allocation of districts to 
phases. 
A binary NREG treatment variable is constructed based on the phased rollout of 
NREG. The variable takes the value 1 if NREG is active in a particular district in a particular 
month and 0 otherwise. Hence, all district series start with zero and end with one after a 
single switch determined by the NREG start date of that district’s phase. 
We also construct an exposure variable which is a simple count of the number of 
months that NREG has been active in a district. Hence, for a given district, exposure is zero 
in every period until the scheme is introduced. Exposure is set to one in the month NREG 
was introduced, and increases by one for each month thereafter. 
In order to address a potential concern that AWI simply report NREG statutory wages 
rather than market wages after the introduction of the scheme, wages for ‘field labor’ (our 
main measure of wages) are compared to NREG statutory wages in January–March 2009, an 
arbitrarily chosen time after the introduction in the scheme in all districts. Only seven 
districts reported market wages equal to NREG statutory wages. These are not necessarily 
misreported, since it is not unlikely that the market wage matched the NREG statutory wage 
in some districts. Still, these districts are dropped from the sample in order to err on the side 
of caution. For the sake of data consistency, we also dropped 34 districts in which the 
location of the AWI data collection center changed over the period, but we have checked that 





Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the remaining 295 districts in 20 states over 
the period May 2000 to June 2011. The names of these states and districts are provided in 
Appendix 2. Appendix 1 recaps the key variables and how they are constructed. Even though 
some observations drop out of the regressions due to missing values, our preferred 
specification in Table 3, column 4, uses 15,272 observations from 209 districts in 18 states. 
As discussed above and in Appendix 3, the effective sample is fairly representative. 
4. Empirical	strategy	
One way to estimate the effect of NREG on wages would be to compare wages before and 
after the rollout in each district (simple differences). However, if the rollout happened 
simultaneously in all districts, it would not be possible to disentangle the effect of NREG 
from an unrelated, simultaneous increase in wage rates across all districts. The phased rollout 
of the program allows us to use the districts in which NREG was already present, or not yet 
present, to take account of wage increases not related to the introduction of the scheme 
(difference-in-difference estimates). 
To take account of permanent differences in wage levels across districts, district fixed 
effects are included in most specifications. Year fixed effects control for national macro-
trends and shocks affecting all districts. Twelve monthly fixed effects are used to take 
account of seasonal patterns in agricultural wages. Furthermore, district-wise linear time 
trends allow for a different underlying wage growth rate in each district. That is, using the 
AWI monthly data we can substantially relax the standard parallel trends assumption. 
The basic specification takes the form 
                                               =  +  + 	,       (1) 
where ity  is the natural logarithm of real daily wages in district i in month t ,  is a constant, 
 is the NREG treatment variable for district i  at time t  and itε is an error term which may 
be serially correlated. Time t is measured as the number of months since January 2000. The 
variable  will be either a binary variable indicating whether or not NREG had been 
introduced in district i by time t, or a non-negative integer counting how many months NREG 
had been in operation in district i by time t. (See the Data section for information on how the 





NREG on agricultural wages, interpreted either as a one-off discontinuity (jump) in wages at 
the time of introduction, or as a kink in the wage growth trend. Every regression incorporates 
robust standard errors, clustered at the district level, to take account of serial correlation in 
the error term. 
The specification with a binary treatment variable tests for a discontinuous ‘jump’ in wages at 
the time of introduction of the program. In specifications where  is, instead, a variable 
counting the months of exposure to the program district i had had at time t, the estimated 
coefficient is to be interpreted as the change in the monthly growth rate of wages caused by 
the program. In a plot of the wage rate against time, the binary treatment variable would 
identify a discontinuous jump in wages, while the exposure variable would identify a kink, or 
change in the slope, in the evolution of wages over time. 
The basic specification will be augmented by district, year and month fixed effects as 
well as by district-specific time trends. Thus, our full specification takes the form 
                      =  + 
 +  +  +  + 	,       (2) 
where  and 
 capture district fixed effects and district time trends,  and  are fixed 
effects for year and month of the year, respectively, and the remaining quantities are as in (1). 
In words, the augmented specification takes account of pre-existing differences in both levels 
and trends in agricultural wage rates at the district level, as well as year-on-year 
macroeconomic developments in wages that might affect the whole country, and also any 
seasonal variation. The way we treat the error terms take account of the fact that wages are 
likely to be serially correlated over time. We identify any variation captured by the treatment 
variable, net of these fixed effects and trends, as the causal effect of the program. 
Selection is a potential source of bias. As mentioned, districts were not randomly 
allocated to the three phases of the NREG rollout. In fact, it was an explicit aim of the 
government that poorer districts should receive the scheme first. But if the difference in 
wages across districts in the three phases could, in the absence of NREG, be wholly 
accounted for by an additive constant term (i.e., a different starting point but parallel trends), 
then such differences would be captured by the district fixed effects. The possibility that 
districts did not just have different starting points but were also on different (linear) wage 





placebo tests as further checks that the estimates are not driven by selection bias.16 
Most papers analyzing the effects of the introduction of NREG compute, as we do, 
difference-in-difference estimates (DID). However, Zimmermann (2012) and Klonner and 
Oldiges (2014) instead rely on regression discontinuity (RD). They use the ‘backwardness 
index’ constructed by the Indian government’s Planning Commission to divide districts into 
phases as the running variable, and identify the effect of the program as the jump in the 
outcome variables at the cut-off that defines the division of districts into Phase II or Phase III. 
(Hence, they are unable to compare the effect of the program across the different phases.) 
RD as a technique for estimating treatment effects has advantages and disadvantages 
relative to DID. The main advantage is to identify the treatment effect based on a 
discontinuity in eligibility, thereby in principle avoiding concerns that treatment and control 
groups are ‘otherwise different’. However, basic RD estimates the treatment effect only at a 
particular value of the running variable, namely at the cut-off. That is, the RD method 
conceptually estimates the effect of the program as the difference in outcome between a 
district that is just poor enough to be included in the program and a district that is just rich 
enough to be excluded. In order to estimate an average treatment effect, which is what is 
usually of the greatest policy interest, one has to make further assumptions on how the 
treatment effect evolves when moving away from the discontinuity—assumptions that 
weaken the potentially clean identification that makes RD attractive in the first place. 
As mentioned above, we address concerns that districts in different phases may have 
been on different pre-existing wage growth paths by allowing for district-wise linear trends, 
and we use placebo tests to confirm that the findings are not driven by non-linear but 
persistent district-level trends. 
                                               
16 The Backward Regions Grant Fund, which was introduced in 2007 and aimed at 250 backward 
districts, is a possible confounder. However, it was much smaller than NREG, peaking at 8% of NREG 
expenditure in 2007-2008 (Planning Commission 2014). It was also not intended as an employment scheme or 
explicitly aimed at agricultural labourers. We therefore believe that this scheme’s effect on agricultural wage rates, 







Table 3 presents the main results: the effect of NREG on real daily wage rates for unskilled 
field labor. The dependent variable here and throughout is the logarithm of daily wage rates 
measured in January 2000 prices. In column 1, field labor wages are regressed on the binary 
NREG treatment variable (specification 1). The coefficient is significant and indicates that 
wage rates in NREG-treated districts and months are approximately 7% higher than in 
districts and months for which NREG was not present. However, this regression does not 
include fixed effects for district, year and month. When these are included in column 2, the 
effect of NREG is no longer significantly different from zero. This indicates that the 
introduction of NREG was not associated with an immediate jump in wages. 
In column 3, wages are regressed on exposure to NREG in months. Fixed effects for 
district, year and month are still included. The coefficient of interest is positive at 0.0031 and 
highly significant. In column 4, district-specific time trends are included in addition. This 
would take account of any bias arising from differential linear trends, that is, wage growth 
rates that vary across districts independently of NREG. This does leave some threats to 
internal validity but they would need to be of a specific type, that is, non-linear trends. To 
recap, the monthly data allow us to substantially relax the standard difference-in-difference 
assumption that treatment and control areas were on parallel trends before the introduction of 
NREG, by controlling for district-wise linear time trends. The coefficient increases to 0.0035 
and remains highly significant. This is our preferred specification (2), and the interpretation is 
that on average, the introduction of NREG in a district increased the growth rate of 
agricultural wages by 0.35% per month or 4.3% per year.17 That is, NREG causes a positive 
and significant increase in the growth rate of agricultural wages of, on average, 4.3% per year 
on top of any underlying trends. 
A gradual rather than immediate effect on wages is consistent with the idea that, once 
launched in a district, the program caused a gradual increase in the demand for labor, 
possibly linked to a gradual improvement in scheme efficiency and capacity. 
                                               





In column 5, the binary and exposure terms are included simultaneously, and the 
results confirm that NREG is associated with an increase in wage growth rather than a step 
change. 
This contrasts with Imbert and Papp (2015) and Azam (2012) who report a positive 
and significant effect of binary NREG treatment on wages. However, both these papers use 
data with a lower frequency of observation than we do, so their results need not result from 
an immediate effect. Hence both their results and ours are consistent with an effect of NREG 
on wages that is gradual or delayed rather than immediate. Likewise, a gradual increase in 
wages like the one we identify should also show up as a binary effect given sufficient post-
intervention data. This suggests that the number of data-points in the post-intervention period 
is insufficient to identify the associated increase in average wage levels. 
While it is possible that NREG causes a permanent increase in wage growth, it is 
more plausible that the effect would diminish over time. In this scenario, the introduction of 
NREG would be followed by a gradual adjustment to a new labor market equilibrium. 
‘Teething problems’ or a gradual ramping up of the scheme in each district could also explain 
an initial growth spurt which slows down as the scheme stabilizes. 
To look for a diminishing effect, a squared exposure term is introduced in the 
regression in column 6. If the effect of NREG diminishes over time, a negative and 
significant squared-term coefficient would be expected. However, while the linear exposure 
term remains positive and significant, the coefficient on the squared term is close to zero and 
not statistically significant. Our interpretation of this is not that the effect of NREG on wage 
growth is permanent, but rather that we do not observe wages for sufficiently long after the 
introduction of the scheme to be able to identify the diminishment. 
It is of interest to consider how the effect of NREG relates to growth in agricultural 
wages in India overall. Rough estimation implies that NREG increased agricultural wages in 
India as a whole by 1.4% per annum between February 2006 and March 2007, by 2.3% per 
annum between April 2007 and March 2008, and by the full 4.3% per annum between April 
2008 and the end of our time series in mid-2011.18 Using a different data source (Wage Rates 
                                               
18 There were 200 districts in Phase I, 130 in Phase II and 295 in Phase III. Weighting all districts equally 
and applying the main estimate of 4.3% annual growth throughout the period, the contribution of NREG to overall 





in Rural India), Reddy (2015) estimates that, in the period 2006–2012, wage rates for male 
workers grew by 4.75% and 5.04% per annum for sowing and ploughing, respectively. This 
suggests that NREG has been an important contributor to overall growth in agricultural 
wages in India, in particular in the period 2008–2011 when all districts were included. 
How does the magnitude of our estimate compare to those of other studies? Ravallion 
et al. (1993) and Gaiha (1997) studied the impact of the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
(MEG) on agricultural wages. MEG started operations in 1978 and is by many considered to 
be a direct precursor of NREG. Gaiha (1997) reports a long run effect of MEG on wages of 
18% and a short run effect of 10%. Ravallion et al. (1993) find little evidence of an increase 
in MEG statutory wages passing through to agricultural wages either in the long or the short 
run. Imbert and Papp (2015) look at the impact of a binary NREG treatment variable, but use 
NSS rather than AWI data. They report that the impact is 4.7% per annum on average, quite 
close to and well within one standard error of our main estimate of 4.3% per annum. 
However, it should be kept in mind that they estimate the impact on earnings rather than 
wage rates. 
By way of benchmarking our findings against minimum wages, we obtained data on 
minimum wages for agricultural labor in January 2006, just before NREG was introduced. In 
India, minimum wages are set at the level of the state. We then computed the ratio of 
(nominal) field labor wage rate to the minimum wage for all districts in our sample. In 
January 2006, this ratio was 0.963 in the average district. The implication is that, using our 
key estimate of 4.3% annual growth in wages, it would take just over a year of exposure to 
NREG for wages in the average district to catch up with the minimum wage. 
However, there is considerable variation across districts. It is, therefore, also of 
interest to look at the proportion of districts where wages met the minimum standard. In 
January 2006, the minimum wage was met or exceeded in 27% of sample districts. Our 
results would predict, if minimum wages were not raised in the meantime, and ignoring 
inflation, that this would rise to 33% of districts after one year of India-wide NREG 
exposure. 
                                               






There is variation in the vigor with which NREG was implemented. Some states have been 
highlighted as ‘star performers’, while others have drawn criticism for the way the scheme 
has been handled (Drèze and Khera 2009). In order to study regional heterogeneity, the effect 
of NREG on wages is estimated state by state. The specification used corresponds to the one 
in Table 3, column 4: the logarithm of real field labor wages by district and month are 
regressed on exposure to NREG in months, and fixed effects for year, month and district as 
well as district-wise time trends are included. 
Figure 3 presents the results. There are positive and significant effects for Rajasthan 
and Andhra Pradesh, two states that were highlighted as top performers in Drèze and Khera 
(2009). The effects are also positive and significant for Kerala and West Bengal. These are 
states that tend to do well on many social metrics. In addition, there are positive and 
marginally significant (at the 10% level) effects for Bihar and Haryana. For all other states in 
the data set, the effects are not individually statistically significant. All but four point 
estimates are positive, and no state is associated with a statistically significant negative effect. 
5.3	Seasonal	variation	
In order to study whether the effect of NREG is uniform throughout the year, wage rates were 
regressed on the exposure variable interacted with 12 monthly fixed effects. As before, the 
regression includes fixed effects for district, year and month along with district-wise time 
trends. The standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. 
The results are presented in Figure 4. The dots represent point estimates and the bars, 
robust 95% confidence intervals. None of the coefficients associated with the first half of the 
year (January–June) are significantly different from zero at the 5% level, while all the 
coefficients for the second half of the year (July–December) are positive and significant. 
Note, however, that the monthly estimates are not statistically significantly different from 
each other, and that all point estimates are positive. 
These findings align well with the fact that July–December corresponds to the main 
agricultural season in India, while January–June is a relatively ‘slack’ season. Hence, to the 
extent seasonal variation can be identified, it appears that the demand shift in labor due to 





demand. This seems reasonable: as with any commodity, we would expect the price of labor 
to increase when it is scarce. 
These results may appear to contrast with the findings of Imbert and Papp (2015), 
who find that the earnings effect of NREG are concentrated in the first half of the year, that 
is, the agricultural slack season. The difference between their findings and ours may arise 
partly from the fact that we study wages while they look at earnings. Earnings equal wage 
rates only for the fully employed. For the un- and under-employed, earnings will typically be 
below wage rates. While it is reasonable that the program should increase equilibrium wages 
more when competition for labor is high, it is also plausible that the effect on earnings should 
be stronger in the slack season, when there are few employment options for agricultural 
workers. 
The difference in results could also be due to the smaller number of districts in the 
AWI data relative to NSS. 
5.4	Impact	on	skilled	labor	wages	
Table 4 presents the results of regressions of wages in the skilled labor categories—
carpenters, blacksmiths and cobblers—on NREG exposure. As before, fixed effects for 
district, year and month are included, as are district-wise time trends. NREG exposure does 
not appear to influence the wages paid for any of these categories of labor. 
The intended beneficiaries of NREG are unskilled agricultural laborers. To the extent 
that skilled and unskilled workers operate in separate labor markets, it is not surprising that 
the wages or carpenters, cobblers and blacksmiths are insulated from the effect of the 
program. For example, if carpenters are typically more fully employed and generally receive 
higher wage rates than those offered by NREG, as seems plausible, then we would not expect 
NREG to attract many qualified carpenters, and hence we should not expect to see an 
equilibrium effect on carpenters’ wages. 
How correlated are these wages to the field labor wages? In Table 5, we examine the 
correlation and report the correlation matrix. The numbers suggest only a moderate 
correlation between field labor wages and the wages of the skilled categories. This further 







NREG requires at least a third of beneficiaries to be women, and also stipulates that women’s 
and men’s wage rates should be equal. The relatively larger increase in demand for female 
labor from NREG projects might be expected to result in a larger impact on women’s wages 
than on those of men. Since women are normally paid less than men, equal wages under 
NREG might also suggest a larger upward pressure on women’s wages. It is therefore of 
interest to compare the effect of NREG on wages across the genders. In Table 6, we study the 
impact of NREG intensity on the gender gap in agricultural wages. Here, men’s and women’s 
wages are considered separately but in a pooled regression; hence the larger sample size. We 
create a binary variable which takes the value 1 for female wages and 0 for male wages. 
NREG’s impact on the gender wage gap is tested by adding an interaction term Treated × 
female in column 1 and Exposure × female in column 2, along with the un-interacted female 
binary variable. If the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant, then, 
arguably, NREG is reducing the agricultural gender wage gap. 
In column 1, the un-interacted ‘female’ coefficient is negative and significant, 
reflecting the gender wage gap in Indian agriculture. The coefficient implies that the wages of 
female field laborers are typically only 79% of their male counterparts’ wages.19 The binary 
treatment coefficient is small and not significant, as is the interaction between treatment and 
female. The implication is that, consistent with the main results above, the introduction of 
NREG is not associated with a step change in wages for either men or women. 
In column 2 we look at exposure to NREG in months rather than the binary treatment 
variable. The un-interacted female variable hardly changes. The un-interacted exposure 
variable (0.32% per month) is positive, significant and similar in magnitude to what we found 
above (Table 3, column 4), while the interaction between female and exposure is small and 
not significantly different from zero. The interpretation is that, in percentage terms, exposure 
to NREG has the same positive effect on the wages of both men and women. In other words, 
NREG exposure neither diminishes nor enlarges the gender gap in equilibrium unskilled 
agricultural wages. 
                                               
19 If fw is female field labour wages and mw is male field labour wages then our estimates predict
ln ln 0.23
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Separate regressions of men’s and women’s wages on exposure yield somewhat 
higher effects for women than for men: the point estimates are 0.30% per month for men and 
0.37% per month for women (not reported). 
These results may appear to contradict those of Azam (2012), who finds that the 
effect on women’s earnings is greater than the effect on men’s earnings. But the distinction 
between wages and earnings is again relevant. Azam’s estimated effect on female earnings is 
consistent with earlier work noting that the program disproportionately employs women 
(Drèze and Khera 2009). Since women in rural India are much less likely to be in wage 
employment than men, NREG might be expected to make a bigger difference to the earnings 
of women than men. But the equilibrium price of labor (the wage rate) will only reflect an 
increase in demand to the extent that the good (labor) becomes scarce. That is, residual slack 
in the female labor market may explain why the scheme’s upward pressure on female-
specific wages is muted. 
5.6	Phase-wise	effects	and	placebo	test	
Hitherto it has been implicitly assumed that the program had an identical effect for districts 
across all three phases. However, the effect could, in principle, differ by phase. Table 7 tests 
for differences in effect size across the three phases. As before, district, year and month-of-
the-year (seasonal) fixed effects are included, as are district-specific time trends, and the 
standard errors are robust and clustered at the district level. 
 
Columns 1–3 examine the impact of the binary treatment variable. Column 1 pools the three 
phases. No significant effect is found for Phase I districts, captured by the coefficient on the 
un-interacted “Treated” variable, and there is also no significant difference in effect between 
Phase I districts and Phase II or Phase III districts, captured by the interaction variables. In 
column 2, Phase III districts are dropped to obtain a cleaner comparison between Phase II and 
Phase I, and in column 3, Phase I districts are dropped, so that Phase II districts are now the 
reference category (“Treated”) for Phase III districts. None of the coefficients are statistically 
significant. 
 





three phases, column 5 drops Phase III districts and column 6 drops Phase I districts. In all 
three columns, the un-interacted Exposure variable is positive and statistically significant, 
while the interactions between Exposure and individual Phase indicators are not. This 
confirms that exposure to the program had a positive effect on wage across all three phases. 
Moreover, while the point estimate varies, it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the 
effect of program exposure was the same for all three phases. 
 
Overall, the phase-wise analysis confirms the finding that NREG had a gradual effect on 
wages, and suggests that NREG had a similar effect in districts across all three phases. 
Table 8 presents the results of a placebo test. Recall that the first phase of NREG 
implementation started in February 2006, the second in April 2007, and the third in April 
2008. For the placebo test, all observations from 2006 onwards are deleted, so that all 
remaining district/time observations are untreated. A placebo treatment indicator was defined 
by shifting the NREG introduction date back by three years in all districts.20 Hence Phase I 
districts ‘received’ the placebo treatment in February 2003, Phase II districts in April 2004 
and Phase III districts in April 2005. 
In column 1, wage rates are regressed on the placebo treatment with the district, year 
and month fixed effects as controls. The estimated effect of the placebo treatment is not 
significant. Column 2 introduces exposure rather than the binary treatment as the main 
independent variable, while still controlling for district, year and month fixed effects. The 
coefficient of interest is close to zero and insignificant. The introduction of district time 
trends in column 3 and a squared placebo exposure term in column 4 does not change the 
overall finding of no effect of the placebo treatment. The placebo test therefore corroborates 
our earlier results and corroborates the interpretation that the effects estimated above are 
indeed caused by NREG. 
We also ran a second placebo check, with the ‘treatment’ shifted back by five years 
rather than three. Again, observations associated with the real treatment (from 2006 onwards) 
were deleted, and the specification was otherwise the same. The results were, qualitatively, 
                                               
20 Given that the data series start in the year 2000, setting the placebo NREG-introduction dates to be 
three years before the actual introduction dates means that the periods of observation before and after the placebo 





the same as for the first placebo test (not reported). 
Finally, following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we ran a third placebo test 
(not reported but available on request). Here we study the period February 2005 to March 
2007 only. We drop Phase I districts from the analysis, and look for a (placebo) effect in 
Phase II districts starting in February 2006. This is when the scheme was introduced in Phase 
I districts, but we would not expect an effect on wages in Phase II districts. For this analysis, 
Phase III districts serve as the comparison group for Phase II’s placebo treatment. The 
specification is otherwise as in the placebo tests reported above, and once again we do not see 
any effect of the placebo treatment. 
5.7	‘Other	agricultural	labor’	
Field labor represents the bulk of unskilled agricultural labor in India (see footnote 
11), and wages for field labor is the main outcome variable considered in this paper. 
However, in the unskilled category, AWI also reports wages for ‘other agricultural labor’. 
According to the AWI definitions, while field labor covers key agricultural tasks like 
ploughing, sowing, weeding, transplanting and reaping, ‘other agricultural labor’ include 
‘coolies employed for watering the fields, load carriers coolies [sic], well diggers, laborers for 
cleaning silt from waterways and embankments, etc.’ 
While quantitatively less important than field labor, and somewhat nebulously 
defined, ‘other’ labor is of interest in part because a significant proportion of employment 
offered under NREG would probably fall under this category. Unskilled rural workers should 
flow freely between field and ‘other’ labor, hence we might expect to see an effect of the 
program on wages for both these categories.21 The wage series for field labor and other 
agricultural labor are also highly correlated (Table 5). 
Table 9 mirrors the regressions presented in Table 3, except that the dependent 
variable is now wages for ‘other agricultural labor’. The effect is significant in columns 1 and 
3. However, while the magnitude remains positive at 0.22% per month, the coefficient is no 
longer statistically significant at conventional levels (p=0.13) once the full set of fixed effects 
and trends are included in column 4. 
                                               





Note that the number of state observations has dropped from 18 in Table 3 to 16 in 
Table 9. It turns out that AWI does not provide wage data for ‘other’ labor in Rajasthan. As 
Rajasthan is one of the previously identified ‘star’ states in terms of NREG implementation 
and associated with one of the clearest state-level effects in our analysis (Figure 3), we 
believe that the lack of wage data from this state may explain why the coefficient for ‘other’ 
labor is not significant overall. (The other dropped state is Uttarakhand.) 
This explanation is corroborated by state-level estimates for ‘other’ labor, in Figure 5. 
While Rajasthan drops from the analysis, the results are otherwise qualitatively similar to 
those for field labor wages (Figure 3). West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh are associated with 
positive effects that are individually statistically significant. The effect is marginally 
significant (at the 10% level) for Bihar. Like for field labor wages, a majority of the state-
wise estimates are positive, and none are negative and significant. 
In Table 10, the effect of NREG on ‘other’ labor wages is allowed to vary by phase. 
As for field labor (Table 7), there is evidence of a kink in the wage series at the time of the 
introduction of the scheme. The estimated effect is 0.33% per month and highly statistically 
significant (p<0.01), and there is no evidence that it varies across the phases. Apart from a 
marginally significant effect for Phase III, there is no evidence of a step change effect. 
We do not find that the effect on ‘other’ labor wages varies by gender or season (not 
reported). 
The evidence presented in this section on the effect of NREG on wages for ‘other 
agricultural labor’ are consistent with the findings for field labor wages. The estimated effect 
in the main specification (Table 9, column 4) is 0.22% per month with a p-value of 0.13. We 
argue that the lack of significance in the main specification may be that AWI does not 
provide wage data for ‘other agricultural labor’ in Rajasthan, one of the states with the 
clearest identified effects for field labor wages. State-level estimates are qualitatively similar 
to what was found for field labor wages, and phase-wise specification confirms that the most 
likely effect of the program is a ‘kink’ (positive and statistically significant) in the plot of 
wages over time, rather than a step change. Furthermore, we cannot reject that the effect of 






This paper estimates the effect of NREG on agricultural wages in India using monthly data 
from 209 districts spread across 18 Indian states in the period May 2000 to June 2011. The 
phased rollout of NREG is exploited to obtain difference-in-difference estimates. Controlling 
for district and time fixed effects and district-wise time trends, the results indicate that on 
average NREG boosted the growth rate of real daily agricultural wages by 4.3% per year. The 
effect of NREG on equilibrium wages appears to be gender neutral and concentrated in the 
main agricultural season. It also appears to be well targeted, as it affects wages for unskilled 
but not for skilled labor. State-by-state estimates suggest significant and positive effects in 
Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Kerala—the former two having previously 
been identified as ‘star performers’ in terms of NREG implementation, and the latter two 
being states that tend to do well on many social indicators. The validity of our identification 
strategy is corroborated with a placebo test. 
It should be noted that, while we control for district-level linear time trends, this does 
not rule out the possibility that our results are driven by non-linear trends that differ between 
districts in the different phases. However, to the extent that these are persistent over time, 
such non-linear trends should have been picked up by the placebo tests. The absence of 
significant coefficients in the placebo tests is reassuring. For our results to be driven by 
underlying differences in district-level wage growth rates, these would have to be non-linear, 
non-persistent and coinciding with the phases of the NREG roll-out. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, for developing country governments to enforce 
statutory minimum wages. Our findings suggest that public employment programs may 
provide governments with a workable, if costly, mechanism with which to influence wage 
rates in the rural unskilled labor market. Since the link between agricultural wages and 
poverty rates are well established, if public works can influence agricultural wages, then they 
constitute an attractive anti-poverty policy instrument with the potential to reach far beyond 
those who actually participate in the program. 
However, considerations of the total welfare effect would also need to take account of 
the effect of the wage increase on the labor supply of the poor, and on employers’ costs, as 
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Note: All data except GDP figures and exchange rates are based on official NREG records. Expenditures were converted to USD using 
historical exchange rates as per early October each year (the mid-point of the Indian April-March financial year). Annual GDP figures were 
obtained from the World Development Indicators and interpolated to correspond to the Indian April-March financial year, except for 2015-
2016 which is based entirely on 2015 GDP data as 2016 data were not available at the time of writing. 







Table 2. Summary Statistics. 
 Mean SDev Min Max Obs 
Unskilled labor wages, average of men's and women's rates 
      
Field labor 58.36 28.73 17 230 15272 
Other agricultural 
labor 
58.20 31.07 15 239 14467 
      
Unskilled labor, wage rates by gender 
      
Field labor (m) 64.57 33.81 18 257 17122 
 - ploughing (m) 73.31 48.31 19 338 12421 
 - sowing (m) 66.87 36.56 19 290 10745 
 - weeding (m) 54.73 19.89 16 167 8945 
 - reaping (m) 64.61 33.78 20 270 10348 
Field labor (f) 51.17 24.07 13 203 15328 
 - ploughing (f) 52.29 15.74 16 98 133 
 - sowing (f) 45.82 13.15 16 135 5575 
 - weeding (f) 52.18 24.51 16 200 9695 
 - reaping (f) 56.90 30.87 14 237 9623 
Other agricultural 
labor (m) 
64.42 36.59 10 279 15754 
Other agricultural 
labor (f) 
51.50 25.95 14 230 14483 
      
Skilled labor wages 
      
Carpenter 104.88 39.89 21 292 16946 
Blacksmith 87.09 33.24 19 247 14331 
Cobbler 71.60 26.15 15 224 10842 
      
Notes: All wages are daily rates, reported in rupees and deflated to January 2000 prices using state-wise monthly 
consumer price indices for agricultural laborers. The main category of unskilled labor is field labor. Field labor 
wages are provided by sub-category (ploughing, sowing, weeding and reaping), except for districts in Andhra 
Pradesh, Maharashtra and Karnataka, for which only wages for field labor (aggregate) are reported. The male and 
female field labor wages analyzed here are constructed as follows. Where provided, the general field labor 
category is used. Otherwise, each observation is the simple average of the wage rates for whichever sub-categories 
are reported for that month. The main outcome variable studied in this paper is the simple average of men's and 





Table 3. Main Results: The Effect of NREG on Unskilled Field Labor Wages 














Treated 0.073*** -0.0031   0.00030  
 (0.021) (0.016)   (0.015)  
       
Exposure   0.0031*** 0.0035*** 0.0035*** 0.0026*** 
   (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
       
[Exposure]2      2.2×10-5 
      (2.7×10-5) 
       
District, year 
and month fixed 
effects  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
District trends  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15272 15272 15272 15272 15272 15272 
Districts 209 209 209 209 209 209 
States 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Notes: The dependent variable is log daily wages, in fixed January 2000 prices, observed between April 2000 and 
June 2011. ‘Treated’ is a binary variable equal to 1 if NREG was active in district i at time t and 0 otherwise. 
‘Exposure’ is a non-negative integer counting the number of months NREG has been active in district i at time t. 





Table 4. The Effect of NREG on Real Wages: Skilled Labor Categories 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Carpenters' wages Blacksmiths' wages Cobblers' wages 
Exposure 0.00059 0.0011 0.0087 
 (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
    
District, year and month 
(season) fixed effects  
Yes Yes Yes 
    
District trends  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16946 14331 10842 
Districts 206 181 156 
States 18 15 12 
Notes: The dependent variables are log daily wages, in fixed January 2000 prices, observed between April 2000 
and June 2011. ‘Exposure’ is a non-negative integer counting the number of months NREG has been active in 












Carpenter Blacksmith Cobbler 




.94 1    
Carpenter .78 .79 1   
Blacksmith .61 .60 .91 1  





Table 6. NREG and the Gender Wage Gap 
 (1) (2) 
 Field labor wages Field labor wages 
Female -0.23*** -0.23*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
   
Treated 0.00024  
 (0.015)  
   
Treated x female -0.0038  
 (0.011)  
   
Exposure  0.0032** 
  (0.0013) 
   
Exposure x female  -0.000076 
  (0.00036) 
   
District, year and month 
fixed effects  
Yes Yes 
   
District trends  Yes Yes 
Observations 32450 32450 
Districts 209 209 
States 18 18 
Notes: The dependent variable is log daily wages, in fixed January 2000 prices, observed between April 2000 and 
June 2011. ‘Treated’ is a binary variable equal to 1 if NREG was active in district i at time t and 0 otherwise. 
‘Exposure’ is a non-negative integer counting the number of months NREG has been active in district i at time t. 






Table 7. The Effect of NREG on Field Labor Wages: Testing for Differential Effects by Phase 














Treated 0.013 0.017 0.012    
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.027)    
       
Treated x Phase II -0.0082 -0.013     
 (0.037) (0.040)     
       
Treated x Phase III -0.024  -0.020    
 (0.038)  (0.042)    
       
Exposure    0.0031** 0.0057*** 0.0064*** 
    (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0021) 
       
Exposure x Phase 
II 
   0.0025 0.0028  
    (0.0018) (0.0018)  
       
Exposure x Phase 
III 
   -0.00037  -0.0025 
    (0.0016)  (0.0021) 
       
District, year and 
month (season) 
fixed effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
District trends  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 15272 9551 8656 15272 9551 8656 
Districts 209 125 127 209 125 127 
States 18 17 18 18 17 18 
Notes: The dependent variable is log daily wages, in fixed January 2000 prices, observed between April 2000 and 
June 2011. ‘Treated’ is a binary variable equal to 1 if NREG was active in district i at time t and 0 otherwise. 
‘Exposure’ is a non-negative integer counting the number of months NREG has been active in district i at time t. 
Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust and clustered at the district level. Phase 3 districts are deleted from 






Table 8. Placebo Test 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 








Treated (placebo) 0.012    
 (0.011)    
     
Exposure (placebo)  0.00010 -0.0013 -0.0014 
  (0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0016) 
     
[Exposure (placebo)]2    5.1×10-6 
    (3.7×10-5) 
     
District, year and month 
fixed effects  
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
District trends  No No Yes Yes 
Observations 7535 7535 7535 7535 
Districts 176 176 176 176 
States 16 16 16 16 
Notes: The dependent variable is log daily wages, in fixed January 2000 prices, observed between May 2000 and 
December 2005. ‘Treated (placebo)’ and ‘Exposure (placebo)’ were generated by pushing forward the NREG 
introduction date by three years in each district and deleting all observations from January 2006 onwards. The 
coefficients reported here are associated with this placebo treatment. Standard errors, in parentheses, are robust 






Table 9. The Effect of NREG on Unskilled ‘Other Agricultural Labor’ Wages 














Treated 0.075*** 0.0014   0.0044  
 (0.023) (0.018)   (0.017)  
       
Exposure   0.0034** 0.0022 0.0022 0.0015 
   (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0018) 
       
[Exposure]2      1.7×10-5 
      (3.1×10-5) 
       
District, year 
and month fixed 
effects  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
District trends  No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 14467 14467 14467 14467 14467 14467 
Districts 198 198 198 198 198 198 
States 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Notes: The dependent variable is log daily wages, in fixed January 2000 prices, observed between April 2000 and 
June 2011. ‘Treated’ is a binary variable equal to 1 if NREG was active in district i at time t and 0 otherwise. 
‘Exposure’ is a non-negative integer counting the number of months NREG has been active in district i at time t. 






Table 10. The Effect of NREG on ‘Other Agricultural Labor’ Wages: Testing for Differential 
Effects by Phase 




Treated x Phase II 0.033 
 (0.041) 
  






Exposure x Phase II 0.019 
 (0.017) 
  
Exposure x Phase III 0.0083 
 (0.020) 
  
District, year and month 
(season) fixed effects  
Yes 
  




Notes: The dependent variable is log daily wages, in fixed January 2000 prices, observed between April 2000 and 
June 2011. ‘Treated’ is a binary variable equal to 1 if NREG was active in district i at time t and 0 otherwise. 
‘Exposure’ is a non-negative integer counting the number of months NREG has been active in district i at time t. 












Notes: The map shows all rural districts of mainland India, colour-coded according to NREG implementation 











Notes: The figure shows real daily field labor wages in January 2000 prices. For each month, year and phase, the 
rates are averaged across the field labor sub-categories, gender and districts. The vertical lines show the time of 











































































Notes: The figure shows the coefficients from state-by-state regressions of log real field labor wages on exposure 
to NREG in months. The regression includes district, year and month fixed effects and district-wise time trends, 
and standard errors are clustered at the district level. The dots show the point estimates, and the bars indicate 95% 
robust confidence intervals. Some states dropped out of the regression due to insufficient observations, and the 
confidence interval for Maharashtra is not shown because it was an order of magnitude wider than for the other 
states (-.48, .44). The effects for Kerala, Rajasthan, West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh are positive and individually 





























Notes: The figure shows the coefficients from a regression of log real field labor wages on 12 monthly binary 
variables, each interacted with exposure to NREG in months. The dots show the point estimates, and the bars 
indicate 95% robust confidence intervals. The regression includes district, year and month fixed effects and 
district-wise time trends, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. While the point estimates are 
positive for every month, the effects are individually statistically significant only in the second half of the year — 







































Figure 5. Effects of NREG on ‘Other Agricultural Labor’ Wages by State. 
 
 
Notes: The figure shows the coefficients from state-by-state regressions of log real ‘other’ unskilled agricultural 
labor wages on exposure to NREG in months. The regression includes district, year and month fixed effects and 
district-wise time trends, and standard errors are clustered at the district level. The dots show the point estimates, 
and the bars indicate 95% robust confidence intervals. Some states dropped out of the regression due to insufficient 
observations. The effects for Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal are positive and individually statistically 
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Daily Wage Rates. All wages are real daily rates, reported here in rupees deflated to January 
2000 prices using state-wise consumer price indices for rural laborers, and provided by district, 
month, labor category and sex. More details in the Data section. Source: Agricultural Wages 
in India (AWI), Ministry of Agriculture, Government of India. 
Treated. NREG treatment binary is equal to 1 if NREG was active in the district in that month, 
and 0 otherwise. Source: Government of India. 
Exposure. This measures the number of months NREG has been active in a particular district. 
It is a non-negative integer counting how many months NREG has been active in district i at 
month t . Source: Government of India. 
Consumer Price Index. Monthly Consumer Price Index for Rural Labourers. This is used to 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
Nawapara, 1 
  











































































    
Palakkad, 1 
     
Midnapur (East), 2 
    
Pathamamithitta, 3 
     
Midnapur (West), 1 
    
Thrissur, 3 
     
Murshidabad, 1 
    
Trivandrum, 3 
     
Nadia, 2 
          
North Dinajpur, 1 
          
Purulia, 1 
          










3. AWI district coverage. The table shows, for each state, the number of districts used in the 
main specification, the overall number of districts in the state, and the proportion of state 














Andhra Pradesh 22 23  80,655,295   84,665,533  95% 
Assam 3 27  2,987,253   31,169,272  10% 
Bihar 8 38  24,015,993   103,804,637  23% 
Chhattisgarh 15 18  24,379,022   25,540,196  95% 
Gujarat 10 26  22,255,208   60,383,628  37% 
Haryana 14 21  22,092,263   25,353,081  87% 
Himachal Pradesh 8 12  5,254,916   6,856,509  77% 
Jharkhand 1 24  1,491,879   32,966,238  5% 
Karnataka 5 30  16,000,580   61,130,704  26% 
Kerala 13 14  32,571,119   33,387,677  98% 
Madhya Pradesh 40 50  70,952,517   72,597,565  98% 
Maharashtra 2 35  7,547,005   112,372,972  7% 
Orissa 26 30  34,807,103   41,947,358  83% 
Rajasthan 9 33  16,328,017   68,621,012  24% 
Tamil Nadu 7 32  11,702,452   72,138,958  16% 
Uttar Pradesh 7 71  24,099,691   199,581,477  12% 
Uttarakhand 1 13  1,927,029   10,116,752  19% 
West Bengal 18 20  78,476,104   91,347,736  86% 
Total for 18 states 209 517  477,543,446   1,133,981,305  42% 
 
 
